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Abstract: 
Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont outline a concrete proposal to implement Permanent Structured 
Cooperation, the new mechanism introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in the area of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy. Their proposal comprises three dimensions: real but realistic 
criteria; a permanent capability generation conference; and promotion of pooling and sharing. 
On such a basis, Permanent Structured Cooperation offers real added value to the EU and 
Member States alike 3 
 
1. Introduction   
 
If the European Union is to be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and 
building  a  better  world,  as  the  European  Security  Strategy  states,  it  is  evident  that  the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) must be strengthened: Europe still struggles to 
deploy more than 4% of its 1.8 million troops, and still the major capability shortfalls have 
not been addressed. Obviously, the existing mechanisms for capability development in the EU 
(as well as in NATO for that matter) have failed to generate significantly more deployable 
capabilities, and will probably never do so. If no action is taken, one cannot even hope for a 
standstill. Things will get worse, because of the economic crisis, which has already resulted in 
yet another series of budgetary cuts, and which will ensure continued budgetary pressure on 
all Member States. So the challenge is to provide the Union with more effective military 
capabilities notwithstanding the current budgetary hurdles.  
CSDP needs a new stimulus. The Lisbon Treaty actually provides several, not in the 
least the appointment of a permanent President of the European Council and the strengthening 
of the position of the High Representative, which can be hoped to generate more strategy, 
coherence and proactive policies at the highest political level. The extended definition of the 
Petersberg Tasks and the adoption of the Solidarity Clause, allowing the use of CSDP within 
the territory of the Union, will help as well to set directions for future CSDP operations. 
Mutual defence is another important addition. That leaves the required capabilities, in which 
area the Treaty introduces a new mechanism: Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence 
(PSCD).  
Unfortunately, PSCD features high among the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty that 
many EU Member States seem to have forgotten that they subscribed to. Perhaps because it is 4 
 
so  ambitious:  by  setting  criteria  for  participation,  for  the  first  time  participating  Member 
States (pMS) would enter into binding commitments in the field of defence and allow an EU 
body, the European Defence Agency (EDA), to assess their performance. This high level of 
ambition was clear from the outset, when PSCD was first formulated in the Convention. It is 
true, the Convention’s initial proposals had an exclusive flavour to them, as some sought to 
create  a  small  avant-garde  of  those  Member  States  spending  the  most  on  defence  and 
launching the most sophisticated armaments programmes, with the others being relegated to a 
secondary role. Such a scheme would indeed have been divisive. However, from the moment 
of its incorporation in the Constitutional Treaty, the provisions of which were afterwards 
copied  into  the  Lisbon  Treaty,  PSCD  has  been  in  the  process  of  being  rethought  as  an 
inclusive mechanism, aiming to incorporate as  many Member States as possible. As EU-
operations  have  shown,  e.g.  in  Chad,  the  contributions  of  all  Member  States  are  indeed 
welcome and necessary.  
Therefore, the challenge now is to configure PSCD in such a way that it strengthens 
CSDP  without  dividing  the  Union.  Rather,  PSCD  ought  to  increase  solidarity  and 
convergence.  No  longer  seeking  to  establish  an  exclusive  and  highly  political  vanguard 
signposting the way ahead, the aim now is to create a pragmatic process that is attractive to all 
Member States, output-oriented and cost-effective.  
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2. The Objective: More Capable, More Deployed  
 
The Protocol on PSCD annexed to the Lisbon Treaty sets out two objectives (Art. 1), one of 
which, i.e. to supply or contribute to a Battle Group, has already been achieved by most 
Member States. This leaves a single major objective: to proceed more intensively to develop 
defence capacities, which must of course be available and deployable, as Art. 2 (c) says. Thus 
PSCD should enable participating Member States (pMS) to increase at a quicker pace than at 
present their national level of ambition in terms of deployability and sustainability. In other 
words, pMS will be able to field more capabilities for the full range of operations in all 
frameworks in which they engage: CSDP, NATO, the UN, and others. In doing so, they will 
contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) and CSDP to which they have agreed in the Lisbon Treaty.  
Through PSCD, pMS can step up their national contribution and/or, as stressed in Art. 
1, participate in multinational forces, European equipment programmes and the activities of 
the  EDA.  The  main  problem  of  Europe’s  armed  forces  is  fragmentation:  limited  defence 
budgets  spent  on  a  plethora  of  small-scale  capabilities  result  in  disproportionately  high 
spending  on ―overhead‖ (and useless intra-European duplications) and,  consequently, less 
spending on deployable capabilities and actual  operations.  To overcome this  inefficiency, 
multinational cooperation is a must. Hence PSCD must be inclusive: the more pMS, the more 
synergies and effects of scale can be created. Thus, PSCD must reconcile inclusiveness and 
ambition, i.e. must translate Art. 2 of the Protocol into quantitative proportional criteria that 
allow all Member States to participate but that do entail a real commitment.  6 
 
3. Criteria for Participation: Realistic but Real  
 
Art. 2 of the Protocol mentions five areas which now have to be operationalized by pMS:  
  To agree on objectives for the level of investment in defence equipment;  
  To ―bring their defence apparatus into line with each other as far as possible‖, 
by  harmonizing  military  needs,  pooling,  and,  ―where  appropriate‖, 
specialization;  
  To  enhance  their  forces’  availability,  interoperability,  flexibility  and 
deployability,  notably  by  setting  ―common  objectives  regarding  the 
commitment of forces‖;  
  To address the shortfalls identified by the Capability Development Mechanism 
(CDM), including through multinational approaches;  
  To take part, ―where appropriate‖, in equipment programmes in the context of 
the EDA.  
 
When translating Art. 2 into concrete criteria, pMS must take into account that criteria 
for participation must be realistic, i.e. they must be within reach of the majority of Member 
States, and must stimulate them to tackle the obstacles to deployability and sustainability, 
notably by addressing the capability shortfalls identified in the Headline Goal process.  
This has 3 implications: First, pMS cannot be expected to fulfil the criteria at the 
launching of PSCD: criteria must be fulfilled by an agreed deadline. Second, criteria that are 7 
 
unrealistic and cannot be expected to generate more deployable capabilities in a reasonable 
timeframe, e.g. defence expenditures representing 2% of GDP, should be avoided. This is 
especially true in times of economic crisis. Finally, PSCD must not just focus on the input, i.e. 
the  level  and  manner  of  spending,  but  also  on  the  desired  output,  i.e.  on  deployable 
capabilities. The obstacles and capability gaps are well-known, hence there is no need to 
concentrate on developing a new Headline Goal, which will simply result in a very similar 
document.  Rather  PSCD  will  be  a  way  of  achieving  the  existing  HG2010  –  which  must 
indeed be considered a living document – in a reasonable timeframe. That is the desired 
output.  
Taking these implications into account, the following criteria can be envisaged – these 
must be seen as one set, to be pursued simultaneously:  
Criterion 1: The overall objective of PSCD is that pMS increase their deployability 
and sustainability by an agreed % by an agreed deadline, e.g. by 25% in 5 years and by 50% 
in  10  years,  until  they  have  reached  an  agreed  target,  e.g.  50%  deployability  and  10% 
sustainability (to the latter most Member States have already agreed in the context of NATO). 
Thus if PSCD is launched in 2010, a pMS which now has the ambition to always have 1000 
troops in the field, should e.g. aim to continually field 1250 by 2015, and 1500 by 2020. The 
objective could be detailed for each component, army, navy and air force, and might also be 
expressed as a % of the total population of each pMS, as a measure of solidarity and burden-
sharing. How to achieve this (enhancing cost-effectiveness, pooling, specialization etc.) is at 
the discretion of each individual pMS, but the final objective is the same for all.  
Criterion 2: In view of solidarity and burden-sharing, pMS should strive to harmonize 
their defence expenditures, particularly those pMS spending less than the EU average (in 
2008, 1,63% of GDP for the 26 Member States participating in the EDA). At the very least, 8 
 
pMS spending less should commit not to further decrease their defence expenditures, neither 
in real terms nor in % of GDP.  
Criterion 3: pMS should contribute fully to the programmes of the EDA, which is to 
be used as the forum to mount collective projects, notably to address the commonly identified 
strategic shortfalls. Obviously, pMS cannot take part in each and every EDA project; they will 
select specific programmes that fit with their expertise and force structure. But their share in 
the overall cost of all projects combined should reflect their respective GDP, in order to 
ensure fair burden-sharing between pMS.  
Criterion 4: As an expression of the political solidarity that must underpin CSDP, pMS 
will participate in all CSDP operations requiring military assets (of the unanimous Council 
decision to launch which they are of course a part) with significant contributions, i.e. with 
military forces deployed in theatre and listed in the Statement of Requirements; the size and 
type are left to their own discretion.   
 
 
4. PSCD as a Permanent Capability Generation Conference   
 
Fulfilling these criteria will ensure that pMS have money to spend – the third criterion should 
help to ensure that they will spend it where it is most needed. Experience shows, however, 
that even repeated calls to reconsider and harmonize national defence planning in order to 
focus on the commonly identified capability shortfalls yield little results. Useful inspiration 9 
 
can be found in the method used to launch CSDP operations: a Force Generation Conference.
1 
Although such conferences can be difficult, as was the case for the Chad operation e.g., in the 
end they have always yielded result.  
Within PSCD the EDA can organize a ―Capability Generation Conference‖ aimed at 
remedying  each  commonly  identified  shortfall  within  a  reasonable  timeframe
2  and 
functioning as a peer review of investment plans. This implies that pMS are willing:  
  To revisit their national defence planning, without any taboos; 
  To do away with national capability initiatives proven to be redundant; 
  To pool assets and capabilities in order to generate savings; 
  To contribute in function of their GDP to the programmes launched to fill the 
shortfalls, as per criterion 3; 
  To actively contribute to negotiations for as long as it takes to achieve success.  
 
This  would  indeed  result  in  a  permanent  conference  –  but  also  in  a  permanently 
relevant EDA.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Once the military assets and capabilities required for a specific upcoming CSDP operation are identified, Force 
Generation Conferences are organized among Troop Contributing Nations. This process goes on until the entire 
list of requirements has been met.  
2 In defence planning, the first significant results can reasonably be expected within 5 years, with cruising speed 
attained within 10 to 15 years. That fact should not be a cause for discouragement, but should rather stimulate all 
concerned not to postpone action any longer.  10 
 
5. “End-to-End” Multinational Cooperation: Pooling  
 
The reality is that many pMS will not be able to meet the criteria and contribute significant 
capabilities if they maintain the same range of  nationally organized capabilities that they 
possess  today.  Therefore  identifying  the  opportunities  for  multinational  cooperation  is  an 
essential instrument to achieve PSCD, allowing pMS to contribute relevant capabilities in a 
cost-effective way.  
The EDA will have the bird’s eye view: based on the information which in the context 
of  the  Capability  Development  Plan  (CDP)  pMS  already  provide  (and  must  continually 
update) about their plans and programmes, and in combination with the progressive results of 
the Capability Generation Conference, it will be able to identify opportunities for cooperation.  
Multinational  cooperation  does  not  imply  that  all  pMS  in  PSCD  cooperate  in  all 
capability areas. Rather within the single PSCD a set of overlapping clusters will emerge, 
with e.g. pMS 1, 2 and 3 cooperating in area X and pMS 2, 3, 4 and 5 cooperating in area Y. 
This cooperation can take various forms, from joint procurement or development projects but 
with  the aim of afterwards equipping national  formations,  to  pooling, i.e. the creation of 
permanent multinational formations. The latter type of ―end-to-end‖ cooperation will be the 
most  effective  in  terms  of  enhancing  cost  effectiveness,  but  the  beauty  of  PSCD  is  its 
flexibility:  it functions  as  a wedding  agency for those pMS seeking cooperation  – which 
should stop flirting with the concept and implement it – but without obliging pMS that prefer 
to contribute nationally to engage in it.  
The model for pooling can be provided by EATC: deployable national assets, in this 
case transport aircraft, remain clearly identifiable and manned by national personnel, but are 11 
 
co-located on one base, where all support functions are multinationalized, as are the command 
& control arrangements. Thus pooling can still offer great flexibility: each pMS in EATC has 
to guarantee that its personnel in the support and in the command & control structures will be 
available whenever a pMS deploys its aircraft – but no pMS is obliged to deploy its own 
actual aircraft each and every time another pMS deploys its aircraft for a specific operation.  
The same model can be applied to fighter wings or army divisions. E.g. by anchoring 
the Belgian median brigade more firmly in the Eurocorps, cost effectiveness can be enhanced 
because  each  individual  pMS  no  longer  has  to  nationally  organize  all  support  functions 
required at division and corps level. pMS can focus defence spending on the line battalions, 
which remain entirely national, and on a more limited range of support functions, as some 
support functions can be abolished at the national level, either in favour of participation in a 
multinational  Eurocorps  structure  or  because  another  Eurocorps  pMS  will  assume 
responsibility in that particular area.  
Pooling can thus be an important instrument to achieve the objectives of PSCD, either 
by deepening integration in relevant existing multinational formations (but without aspiring to 
pull all existing frameworks into PSCD), or by new initiatives. Today, most multinational 
formations  have  limited  permanent  elements  and  except  for  FHQs  are  rarely  if  ever  the 
framework in which troops are deployed. In some cases, pMS could base cooperation on 
successful common experience in providing a Battle Group, using that as a basis to build a 
larger-scale and more permanent multinational formation. In a way, the Battle Groups predict 
the pattern of cooperation, as in that context the usual suspects for cooperation have already 
found each other. PSCD can thus  provide the link between the many existing bottom-up 
initiatives and the need for more top-down steering.  12 
 
Obviously, pooling is easier when pMS use the same equipment, hence smaller pMS 
especially will inevitably have to take into account with whom they want to cooperate as a 
major factor in procurement decisions. For pooling to increase cost-effectiveness, national 
structures and bases must naturally be pooled and thus in some instances cut.  
 
 
6. The Crucial Role of the EDA  
 
Art. 3 of the Protocol gives a crucial role to the EDA, which ―shall contribute to the regular 
assessment of pMS’ contributions [...] and shall report thereon at least once a year‖. A binding 
commitment needs a body overseeing its implementation. Art. 46 (4) TEU even provides for 
the  possibility  of  suspension  from  PSCD  if  a  pMS  no  longer  fulfils  the  criteria.  Those 
decisions will be taken by the pMS, on the basis of the data collection and assessment by the 
EDA.  
Enabling the EDA to fulfil this task has a number of implications, translated into the 
following proposals:  
  Obviously, pMS must continue to show full transparency to the EDA about all 
aspects  of their  defence effort. The EDA must be  able to  freely  enter into 
contact with all relevant national authorities of pMS; 
  The EDA will have to organize itself for its assessment role. If additional staff 
or  funds  are  required,  pMS  should  provide  these,  according  to  GDP. 
Contribution of national personnel to the relevant EDA body would ensure that 
the views of all pMS are represented in each assessment; 13 
 
  In view of democratic accountability and as a measure of peer pressure, the 
results of the assessment process should as far as possible be made public. This 
could  be  part  of  an  EDA  Yearbook  on  CSDP,  a  comprehensive  report  on 
CSDP policies and current operations, but focussing in particular on capability 
development and the contribution of each pMS.  
 
A real assessment of capabilities concerns not just the figures, but performance in the 
field. In addition to the role of the EDA and on a voluntary basis, pMS could also agree to 
exercises and manoeuvres and ―tactical evaluation‖ by the EU Military Staff, which could in 
time lead to a process of certification.  
 
 
7. Common Funding  
 
The decision to launch a CSDP operation is taken by the Council acting unanimously and thus 
each time reflects the broadest political solidarity. However, the current rules governing the 
sharing among Member States of expenditures arising from the military implications of such 
an operation, the Athena mechanism, do not reflect a similar solidarity. For military CSDP 
operations very few expenditures are eligible for common funding. The guiding principle is 
still ―costs lie where they fall‖, meaning in practise that those Member States providing the 
required military forces and capabilities also have the honour to pay for about 90% of the total 
cost of a given operation. More solidarity in terms of funding would encourage more Member 14 
 
States to participate with even larger military contributions and ease the process of ―Force 
Generation Conferences‖.   
For CSDP operations, pMS could be encouraged to create in PSCD their own more 
equitable system of burden-sharing, based on common funding. A key to share the global 
common costs among pMS would be established (which could be similar to the one used at 
present by Member States for CSDP operations). Contributing capabilities mentioned in the 
Statement of Requirements would however count as a contribution in kind. pMS would thus 
be encouraged to invest in the ―right‖ capabilities and to effectively deploy them.  
 
 
8. Launching and Governing PSCD  
 
The Treaty states that the Member States intending to participate notify the Council, which 
will launch PSCD by a Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) of all Member States, after consulting 
the  High  Representative  (Art.  46  (2)  TEU).  Later  admissions,  and  suspensions,  will  be 
decided upon by QMV of the pMS only. All other decisions will be taken by unanimity of the 
pMS.  
In order to signal their commitment and ensure the necessary political impetus, it is 
proposed that pMS mark the creation of PSCD by a declaration at the level of the European 
Council.  Only  the  Heads  of  State  and  Government  can  provide  the  high-level  political 
impetus that will stimulate Foreign and Defence Ministers to take action. The annual report on 
PSCD by the EDA should be discussed at that level as well, for the European Council to 15 
 
define  general  guidelines.  Within  those  guidelines  pMS  in  the  Foreign  Affairs  Council, 
chaired by the High Representative, can adopt the necessary decisions. Within the board of 
the EDA, pMS’ Ministers of Defence should also meet regularly, e.g. twice yearly, in order to 
monitor progress and inform the Council and European Council prior to the discussion of the 
annual report. Within the EU Military Committee too and the working groups advising it, 
pMS can discuss PSCD.  
pMS  can  thus  make  full  use  of  all  existing  EU  institutions  to  govern  capability 
development  in  the  context  of  PSCD.  In  order  to  ensure  full  coordination,  non-pMS  can 
always  participate  in  all  PSCD-related  discussions,  without  voting  rights.  That  will  also 
ensure  maximum  information  when  deciding  on  operations,  always  by  unanimity  of  all 
Member States.  
 
 
9. Conclusion: Real Added Value  
 
The  added  value  of  such  PSCD  is  real,  for  the  EU,  NATO,  national  governments,  and 
taxpayers alike.  
Inclusiveness. PSCD is not to punish or exclude, but to encourage all to do more; the 
best PSCD is that at 27.
3 Yes, the defence budgets of many individual Member States are 
relatively modest in scale, but together they represent tens of billions of euros  – a chance to 
                                                 
3 Implying that within PSCD bi- or multilateral cooperation between certain pMS cannot be vetoed by another 
pMS; only constructive abstention remains possible.  16 
 
get  more  bang  out  of  such  sums  should  not  be  too  easily  ignored.  PSCD  should  be  an 
attractive forum for those able and willing to join when it is launched as well for those that 
might join later. Those opting out will not suffer direct political disadvantages – but they will 
miss out on the very real benefits that PSCD will bring. Hence realistic but real criteria: 
achievable by every Member State that wants to, yet a binding commitment to do more than 
today;  open  to  entry  by  all,  but  ensuring  growing  solidarity  and  increasingly  ambitious 
commitments as the process continues.   
Coordination.  While  preserving  flexibility  and  bottom-up  initiative,  coordination 
through the permanent Capability Generation Conference should generate concrete projects to 
address all shortfalls needed to fulfil the Headline Goal 2010. This has proved impossible 
through an exclusively bottom-up approach, which has achieved some remarkable results – 
but  which  has  also  reached  its  limits.  Without  collective  top-down  steering,  significant 
progress is beyond reach. Simultaneously, the Capability Generation Conference will allow 
those  that  seek  cooperation  to  find  suitable  partners,  including  for  deepening  existing 
multinational units or setting up new ones. This is not to pull all multinational military units 
and structures into PSCD nor even to have some of them managed by PSCD, but to stimulate 
pMS to use the full potential of such multinational formations, and to use them as frameworks 
for common deployment – in this regard as well cost-effectiveness will improve.  
Cost-effectiveness. The criterion will gently oblige pMS to explore the full potential of 
four important cost-cutters: (1) collaborative armaments projects (from cradle to grave); (2) 
pooling;  (3)  role  specialisation;  (4)  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  doing  away  with 
redundancies, for Europe does not need 1.8 million uniforms and the combined cost of all 
redundant  assets  and  structures  by  far  exceeds  what  is  required  to  address  the  strategic 
shortfalls. These cost-cutters will produce a budgetary margin which, if pMS live up to the 17 
 
commitment not to lower their defence expenditures (as per criterion 2), will stay within the 
defence budget. The other criteria will ensure this margin will be spent on deployable and 
effectively deployed capabilities.  
Assessment. pMS will of course decide, but the assessment role given by the Treaty to 
the EDA will ensure that for the first time their performance will be evaluated by a neutral 
body. Simultaneously, the Capability Generation Conference will engender an informal peer 
review process of investment plans. Unlike ESDP, CSDP should be more than a catalogue of 
paper commitments.  
Significant military contributions. The permanent dialogue on defence planning will 
allow each and every pMS to opt for the development of specific military capabilities that 
would allow it to participate with significant military contributions in  all of the potential 
Petersberg Tasks. That requires each to focus on his own centres of competence, to acquire or 
further  develop  those  military  forces  and  capabilities  proven  to  be  scarce  during  Force 
Generation  Conferences,  and  to  abandon  capabilities  proven  to  redundant.  This  will 
considerably enhance political solidarity among all Member States and will strengthen the 
Union as such, at no additional financial cost.  
Boots on the ground. And what ultimately counts most: Europeans will have available 
and effectively deploy more troops for operations, be it under EU, NATO or UN command or 
in another multilateral configuration. In doing so they will finally live up to the expectations 
generated by the European Security Strategy and the Lisbon Treaty.  
 
These are half a dozen good reasons why Member States should launch PSCD and 
mark  the  occasion  by  a  declaration  of  the  European  Council.  The  Heads  of  State  and 18 
 
Government  can  provide  the  high-level  political  impetus  that  will  stimulate  Foreign  and 
Defence Ministers to take permanent and structured action.  
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Europe is in a constant state of flux. European politics, economics, law and indeed European 
societies  are  changing  rapidly.  The  European  Union  itself  is  in  a  continuous  situation  of 
adaptation.  New  challenges  and  new  requirements  arise  continually,  both  internally  and 
externally.  
The College of Europe Studies series seeks to publish research on these issues done at the 
College of Europe, both at  its  Bruges  and its  Natolin  (Warsaw) campus.  Focused on the 
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